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Defence History Reference Section 2
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Home | TWR Index | The Editor | Comments | Aviation |
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Defence History Reference Section 2
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TWRV1-ISSUE: 1. (JUNE 10, 1987) On June 5, the government announced plans for a new Air Division and a two-brigade Army Division for Europe; ten to twelve new nuclear-powered submarines to be based on the east and west coasts; more than thirty-six new surface ships for the Navy - including six new frigates and 30 small vessels for minesweeping, training and other sundry duties; the replacement of our main battle tank (Leopard I); a manpower increase of forty-eight thousand reservists; an under-ice surveillance network for the arctic; six new long range patrol aircraft; the modernization of the medium range CP121 Tracker; and on a smaller scale, numerous equipment additions or modifications; and many specific and less specific re-taskings throughout the Canadian Forces. At the same time the government vowed to address arms control, as well as social, industrial, and academic issues under the heading of national defence, over the next fifteen years. Somewhat of an anticlimax, the white paper is strongly NATO/Europe oriented with a lesser but noteworthy devotion to arctic and coastal sovereignty. NORAD gets less attention than expected. During a European crisis only two dedicated air-defence squadrons (24 aircraft) of CF-18s, augmented by elements of the 410 operational training squadron, would defend Canada against air attack from the north. The yet to be formed 416 and 433 squadrons, originally tasked to the northern European flank, will be assigned along with the 5th Brigade to deploy to Germany in the event of hostilities there. The two squadrons, 416 and 433 from Cold Lake and Bagotville respectively - combined with 409, 421, and 439 squadrons already in Germany - effectively create the five-squadron Air Division mentioned briefly in the white paper. Although the significant air threat to Canada is discussed in some detail, no new equipment resources are directed to NORAD. The Toughest Decision: Few informed individuals would argue with the more prominent decision to reassign the 5th Brigade to Germany, but the furor over the plan to buy nuclear-powered submarines has reached a crescendo. Several Canadian governments have, over the last two decades or more, discussed and rejected a plan to acquire nuclear submarines. Much of this past and current debate is driven by emotion, and concern or misunderstanding about the broad nuclear/environmental issue. A wide range of parochial arguments about allegedly better allocation of financial resources have also come forth. Nuclear submarine technology has in recent years reached the point where Canada, with only a limited defence budget, can afford to take advantage of the efficiency and effectiveness of the nuclear-powered sub. Considering the stormy vastness of the icy seas in which the Canadian navy must sail for long periods away from port - not to mention the lively activity of high-speed soviet submarines in Canadian waters - the government’s strategy looks sound. But there are other factors. One such concern is the fact that the first of these ten boats will not be delivered until 1996 with the last unit being completed around the year 2011. The schedule leaves the Soviet threat on our three-ocean coastline virtually unattended by our warships, but for a handful of frigates and destroyers, for a great many years. The potential complications that could occur - as our struggling shipbuilding industry musters for the task of building some 65% of these boats - are going to cause numerous headaches for future day governments as tricky industrial problems arise to create new ammunition for those who tote the cost-versus-benefit question. Some hard decisions will be needed if the plan for this worthwhile addition to the navy is to become an effective reality. The White Paper provides scanty detail of policies and strategies that are in part, reminiscent of the Arctic sovereignty concerns in the early Trudeau years and almost nostalgically, the promised Air Force and Army Divisions in Europe bring to mind recollection of the military thinking in the mid-fifties. Although overall not in any way imaginative, the government’s defence policy paper appears to provide some very practical solutions to long outstanding problems. While it could hardly be said that the white paper contained any surprises, and there is little evidence of any real brilliance - after sixteen long years of waiting - a sigh of relief and a new spirit of excitement can be felt throughout the Canadian Armed Forces at home and abroad. For them it’s a statement of purpose and moral support. For the Canadian people it’s a promise of new awareness and involvement. For business and industry it’s a new series of interesting challenges. ...And for Defence Minister, Perrin Beatty,...it’s an enormous and laudable accomplishment. -- Mike O’Brien
THE DEBATE CONTINUES Detractors abound ... as one would naturally come to expect in a country that for so long has neglected it’s armed forces to the point of embarrassment. But who would have expected the most biting comment to come from within the highest ranks of the very government that created the new defence policy? Can this be a government ploy to avoid a more sensible and difficult debate (if indeed that is forthcoming) on the white paper? Hardly; but the verbal clobbering of Defence Minister Perrin Beatty by the Supply and Services Minister Monique Vezina has served to provide plenty of ammunition for humorous comment by the nation’s government watchers. Vezina - who’s castigations included criticism of Beatty’s youth (he is 37 years young) and the defence minister’s alleged inability to comprehend national(?) issues such as regional development -- drew quick witticisms from the defence minister who’s immediate shock apparently caused him to be thrown "from his tricycle". Vezina’s remarks came as a surprise to most Ottawa watchers who expected greater restraint having seen the example of External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, who must be biting a large calibre bullet in silence over arctic sovereignty, foreign affairs and nuclear-submarine vs. icebreaker issues. It seems that the Supply and Services minister is rushing to the party with her own political agenda, just as many others who have commercial interests are also hurrying to jump into the fray, of what must appear to be a defence spending bonanza. Vezina advocates powerful legislation that would use defence spending as a tool for regional development and that would probably, in effect, allow government to fulfill regional political objectives. Vezina’s Department of Supply and Services is the government’s purchasing organization which buys supplies and equipment used by the Department of National Defence and all other government departments. Cost -- although not in any way specified in the government’s recently announced (June 5) defence policy white paper -- is the most often referenced element of that document in the rhetorical comment of both the media and Canadian politicians. The irony of that statement, will surely not escape you. The white paper contains no cost estimates that provide sufficient data to arrive at a total package price. The government has been deliberately nonspecific about the total worth of the package, other than to say that the plan calls for a rate of defence spending increase "that will not fall below 2%" annual real growth over the next 15 years. And that "Increased resources above this planned funding floor will be provided as major projects forecast in the White Paper are introduced" The single most expensive item of equipment in Minister Perrin Beatty’s defence policy paper is a batch of 10 to 12 nuclear submarines. Pricing these at roughly five billion dollars as he has done in recent statements to the press and public, the defence minister concurs with the shortlisted manufacturer’s of nuclear-powered submarines, Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited of Great Britain and Pronav of France. RUBIS AMETHYSTE class submarines are said to be nearly $350 million while the suggested price for the more expensive, faster and larger TRAFALGAR class sub is $500 million. The government has also suggested that an additional $2 - $3 billion dollars be allowed for infrastructure, support, and physical plant costs thus bringing to roughly $8 billion the total anticipated package price. "$8 Billion is not enough money to cover the added costs of teaching the Canadian shipbuilding industry how to build nuclear submarines" say the opponents. Taking into consideration the severe problems encountered by the government whilst attempting to control costs and delivery dates on the six new CITY class patrol frigates, the POLAR 8 icebreaker and the TRIBAL class destroyer update and modernization programme (TRUMP), one has to give some credence to statements of doubt about the ability of the Canadian industry to compete with the international sail-away prices of the proposed nuclear-powered vessels. The TRUMP programme, originally slated for a $600 million expenditure, is now believed to be headed for the $1.4 billion mark. There are also similar unconfirmed rumours circulating within government and industry about the other troubled naval programmes. To say that it is wrong for the government to plan 65% Canadian industry involvement is absolute heresy, but on the other hand, if the government has grossly understated the costs for this plan, as some experts believe, they may well have seriously jeopardized the nuclear submarine project in its entirety. ‘A fly on the wall’
witness to the bustling activity along Sparks street in Ottawa would tell you that the
"action is hot" as the reported comings and goings of people representing the
likes of; Versatile Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited, Pronav France, Canadian
Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited, Rockwell International, Marine Industries Limited,
Computing Devices Company, SNC Engineering, Halifax Dartmouth Industries Limited, Lavolin
Incorporated, Fenco Engineering Limited, Litton Canada Limited and others are
creating a carnival-like atmosphere amongst the consultants and lobbyists in the capitol
city. At a slower pace, international manufacturers of tanks and other military vehicles,
weapon systems, ammunition and aircraft are making their way to the world’s
newest defence business ‘hotspot’ to get themselves established on the ground
floor in what is broadly accepted as a country that is a ‘good prospect for long term
defence contracts’ and an ideal place from which marketing assaults can made against
the lucrative U.S. market. Canadian experts have seldom forecasted inflation rates with perfect accuracy and therefore it is next to impossible to firmly fix a dollar value on future defence spending. But ignoring that fact for a moment and using an arbitrary inflation factor of 4% with an additional factor of 2% (the promised annual rate of increase) applied to the current $10.3 billion budget and extended over 15 years (budget year 2004/02)the government will spend a total of $241.21 billion (budget year dollars) over the next 15 years. The portion of that money that is spent on capital equipment quite simply depends on the price of acquisitions and the period of time over which these costs are spread. Currently the Department of National Defence spends 26% of its annual budget on capital equipment. Applied against our arbitrary 15 year budget estimate of $241.21 billion, the current 26% capital apportionment would indicate that DND has $62.71 billion for capital projects after funds are disbursed to cover the costs of personnel (approx. 40% in the past), operations and maintenance (approx. 25%), statutory costs (approx. 8%) and sundry grants and contributions (approx. 1.4%). Without going into detailed estimates for capital projects one would be fairly safe in saying that the 2% real growth in funding will not provide sufficient resources for the projects already underway as well as those capital programmes referenced in the white paper. Albeit the Defence Minister has stated that on an as-required basis, increased resources will be provided by the Government as major projects are introduced, but regrettably, that will depend on governments to be elected many years from now. -- Mike O’Brien.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT VERSUS
REVITALIZED ARMED FORCES Sorely stung in the CF-18 SES debate, Vezina must have recalled that episode of regional rigmarole when she said, "it is impossible to take a decision when half of the country is crying and the other part is laughing." The chief purchaser for the government wants legislation installed to allow for economically disadvantaged regions of Canada to capture their share of the defence buck, and to provide for an increase to the overall domestic share of the military’s capital equipment programmes. Regrettably, these common sense suggestions were lost amidst a volley of personal critisisms in her less than tactful attack upon the defence minister. Almost half of the purchases made by her department are done on behalf of the Department of National Defence (DND). Over the next fifteen years DSS will spend in excess of $6 billion yearly from DND’s combined capital and operations/maintenance budgets. Seeking greater control over regional allocation of these procurement resources, Mrs Vezina proposes that even if a premium must be paid, defence procurements should be directed to areas of high unemployment. The major question that must by asked is; "At what price?" The $8 Billion nuclear-powered submarine budget could easily grow to become a $20 billion nightmare if the production of vessels is to be scattered around the country solving the various interests of bickering cabinet ministers. Political objectives must not be served by new regional development legislation. And the wording of such a document must give industry and civil servants the clear direction they need. "Find me a living, breathing, Canadian in Calgary, Alberta who can populate a circuit board.... and I’ll give him an order for..." was the statement of one frustrated government buyer of military hardware as he sought to comply with the regional disparity concerns of the Department of Supply and Services (DSS). "If I can’t relocate in Halifax or Sydney" said an Ontario-based businessman, "I might just as well close down my factory." "Because the last ‘big one’ (military capital equipment procurement) went to Quebec, does that mean that my Montreal based firm will lose out on the next one that comes along?" pondered another defence product manufacturer. Satisfying the often hard to determine regional objectives of the Canadian government can be more frustrating than any other aspect of the defence business. At one time, the most important elements involved in the competition for military contracts were; technical compliance, competitive pricing, and on-time delivery. Today, the defence product manufacturer has to be conversant and compliant with a broad range of government aims including; regional development, industrial development, job creation, small business development, international competitiveness, federal/provincial relations, and regional- political requirements. Once technical compliance has been determined by DND’s experts, DSS then focuses on it’s own criteria of; value for dollar spent, reduction of regional disparities, increasing Canadian content, promoting research and development, improving technical innovation, increasing competition, and contracting with Canadian small businesses. Ordinarily, fulfillment of these objectives alone, puts the contractor in the position of having to make some tricky compromises between efficiency, delivery schedules and government imperatives, that inevitably causes production cost increases which must then be passed along to the customer. It’s not at all surprising that most procurement programs suffer significant cost-overruns. Illegitimate creation of defence industry factories within inappropriate regions could cause wildly soaring costs on even the simplest of projects and the rapid consumption of DND budget resources. With some 27 months before the next Canadian federal election, it is not hard to imagine how the Conservative government might be tempted to abuse regional development legislation, and instead of serving national defence industrial requirements, buy increased voter popularity using DND budget resources. The net result could destroy Canadian Armed Forces’ hopes to ever achieve completely the modest re-furbishment programme outlined in the white paper. Micheal John O'Brien
Before the end of spring,1988, the Canadian government will select a design for Maritime Command’s new fleet of nuclear powered submarines. With an objective of 65% domestic Canadian construction, the proposed budget for the subs is presently $8 billion. After design selection a team of Canadian and foreign companies must be tasked to build the new Canadian sub, stuff it with electronics and weapons, and support it for its’ lifetime. With two countries and two different designs to choose from, the Canadian government has a tough first decison to make. Which sub? Or is it which country? Within the defined envelope of capability and cost there are two designs that meet the Canadian criteria: the British TRAFALGAR class and the French RUBIS class. Between the two there are major differences in capability, size and cost. But more noteworthy is the fact that the two designs orginate from fiercly competitive nations, only one of which is a full NATO partner. The British designed TRAFALGAR class is built by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited (VSEL), a private company whose major warship building yards are located in Barrow, England. The 5200 tonne (submerged displacement) TRAFALGAR class is capable of underwater speeds in excess of 32 knots, a diving depth of 300 meters, and has 5 tubes capable of launching a broad range of weapons including the popular Mark 48 wire-guided torpedo and the submarine version of Harpoon, an effective anti-shipping sea skimmer. Apart from the fact that some root technology originates from the U.S. and although licencing discussions have been undertaken with other countries, the technology of the TRAFALGAR class has not been shared with any other and thus Canada would be the firt export sale of the class for VSEL. "Over twenty years of continuous development of nuclear submarines, for a navy that is one of the most intense operators of submarines in the world ... and using this design in large numbers itself ... are the three key features ..." were the words of VSEL Export Manager Mr. Brian Everard when asked about the British sub in an interview with TWR. When prompted to talk about what he thought of Canadians buying French submarines Everard was reluctant to comment but offered; "as is well known, France only operates in a limited fashion within NATO so it would inevitably raise questions about the interoperability of that lot (RUBIS)." A major contributor to NATO, Great Britain is a powerful ally of Canada. The Royal Navy has traditionaly been the model for the development of the Canadian Navy. A strong bond exists between the two as a result of continued interface, interchange and cooperation on a regular basis. The French built RUBIS class nuclear-powered submarine is built by the state owned Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN) and is offered by DCN in concert with Thomson CSF which in effect is also completely owned by the French government. The two companies are represented by PRONAV FRANCE, a sales and marketing partnership, proposing a design that is derived from the RUBIS class, AMETHYSTE batch. The RUBIS class is already in service with the French Navy and will be joined by the newer AMETHYSTE batch, the first of which is presently under construction. The proposed Canadian design will have a submerged displacement of 2670 tonnes, a diving depth of 300 meters and a speed of 25 knots below surface. The vessel is smaller and slower than TRAFALGAR, has only four torpedo tubes, but is 30% less expensive than the sail-away price of TRAFALGAR. "This perception that you can’t deal with the French is just that, its a perception." says Commander RCN (retired) Keith Davies, who is now the Canadian representative (Ottawa) of Pronav France. "Twenty years ago we (Canadian Navy) were very happy dealing with the British that we had an obvious tie with, then we turned and looked south of the border and we had a very good relationship with the U.S. Navy. I’me talking from a Canadian Navy point of view. ...and then over a period of the last dozen years the emphasis on the armed forces diminished a great deal from a political point of view. We were not as welcome as we always used to be in the United States or Britain because we were net takers as opposed to net contributors and I think that soured to a great extent, the very open, comfortable relationship we had with both the British and the Americans. We (Canadian Navy) haven’t dealt seriously with the French or the French government on an industrial or defence basis in the period since De Gaulle said what he had to (say)." TWR asked Davies to comment on the availability of French technology."The French government has refused to sell the (nuclear submarine) technology up to this point in time nor to share the technology with another government. To the best of my knowledge it has been discussed between Mitterand and Mulroney,... there has been a very high level delegation in Canada." As the Canadian Navy resumes it’s once significant stature as an effective modern Navy with appropriate integration of capability with NATO allies, it is highly unlikely that senior Canadian naval planners will ignore the traditional ties with Great Britain. The propensity to fashion the service after the Royal Navy however, does not totaly preclude possible acceptance of the French Rubis derivative into the fleet. The French proposal, just like the British, has strong attributes. The Pronav France proposal may offer strategic advantages in a potentialy greater number of smaller subs. The government of France, owner of DCN/Thomson CSF, may offer a far more attractive industrial benefit package than the privately owned VSEL. But the involvement of the French design in the competition poses some interesting political problems. Reconciling a pro-France Canadian decision, with the standardization and interoperability objectives of NATO, may be a hopelessly impossible task. It brings forward the often repeated question; "When push becomes shove,... can we count on the French?"Mike O’Brien
CANADIANS SEEK WIN IN $3.5
BILLION US ARMY CONTRACT On July 1, the U.S. Army officialy began to evaluate four air defence systems at White Sands, New Mexico. The test and evaluation programme is part of the $3.5 billion Forward Area Air Defence Line-Of-Sight Forward-Heavy competition. Says U.S.Army Colonel Jim Lawson of Fort Bliss, Texas, "Unlike the Division Air Defence (DIVADS-Sgt.York cancelled 1985) project we have a much more open approach. Right from the start we have invited media representatives to come here and receive a full briefing from each of the contenders, to actualy look at the equipment, and to receive a briefing from the White Sands missile range experts". Fierce competition is evident in the quest for the multi billion dollar FAAD L-O-S Forward Heavy contract. Calling for a "low-risk, non-developmental system", the Army plans to award a contract in January 1988. Various interests would be served if that date was postponed, which may in fact happen as a result of lobby efforts presently underway. Competing missile systems include Crotale/Liberty, Roland/Paladin, Rapier and ADATS. All candidates, with the exception of ADATS -- which in effect is a U.S. system -- are of European origin and have created U.S. corporate teaming arrangements to support U.S. government objectives for domestic industrial participation. ADATS, which is a Martin Marietta U.S. system, was designed in the United States in cooperation with Swiss based Oerlikon Buhrle. With Canada as its first customer, ADATS has evolved as a North American programme whereas each of the other three competitors are American/European partnerships. Combining guns and missiles, system designers amongst the four FAADS contenders have used varying combinations of passive and active devices to accomplish target acquisition, identification, designation, tracking and guidance. The American/Canadian ADATS system is notably the only "passive" system using Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and laser technologies as the primary methods of tracking targets and guiding the missile to a successfull kill. Employment of such passive systems minimizes the possibility of "jamming" by enemy electronic counter measures. ADATS, which is co-produced by Martin Marietta U.S. and Oerlikon Aerospace of Canada, was nearly eliminated from the bidding process in the first quarter of this year when sharply worded programme documents specified that contender systems had to be in production mode. Company officials with the help of the Canadian Government and the Department of National Defence were successful in convincing U.S. Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger that ADATS would be compliant with delivery requirements. If necessary, Weinberger was told, Canadians would adjust their own delivery schedule in order that U.S. Army conditions be satisfied. Highly respected by even the fiercest of competitors, ADATS is the most modern system available for delivery in the time frame of the FAADS programme. Actions of the Canadian government have been consistant with the fact that Canadian aerospace and defence companies could be awarded as much as $750 million in subcontracts should the ADATS system be selected by the U.S. Army. Five test firings of ADATS missiles, organized strictly for company purposes, were conducted at White Sands missile range between June 22 and June 29. Apart from electrical problems that were attributed to "undetected human error", the firings were successful. Missiles were fired from both the Bradley M3 vehicle and the M113. Company insiders contacted by TWR seemed genuinely pleased. Members of a Turkish delegation that visited Canada in the early part of the week were present for firings at White Sands on the 26th. Destroyed targets included QF86 RPVs (airborne target drone) and stationary target boards (simulating low level helicopters). Most speculation in the early days of the programme (bids were submitted on May 29 of this year) favoured two contenders, Rapier and ADATS. The recent acquisition by LTV Corp. (Crotale/Liberty) of Mr. Phillip Gregory, formerly of Martin Marietta, has caused some observers to alter their thinking. Gregory, an alleged superstar among air defence weapons marketers, briefed media representatives at White Sands last week. He will spearhead the marketing and sales effort of LTV Corp. in cooperation with Thomson CSF. "Gregory", says a TWR source in Washington DC, "was responsible for inviting Canadian officials to participate in the early development stages of ADATS allowing them (Canadians) to think that they played a significant role in that process. Phil Gregory was instrumental in convincing U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to communicate his advocacy of the ADATS system to Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney." The LTV/Crotale bid suggests that while the french Crotale missile would be included in early production batches if their system was selected, a new missile, Liberty, would be supplied in later deliveries after approximately 18 months. The team can obviously be included in that group mentioned earlier that seeks a postponement of the programme. Thomson CSF has been accused in repeated rumours, of having sold Crotale to U.S. adversary, Lybia. As one Washington DC wag put it, "Wouldn’t it be interesting if the CIA learned that F-111’s, in the Tripoli raid, had been fired upon with Crotale?". This, although perhaps (as the French might contend) an absurd scenario, is indicative of the concerns that some Americans have about the French system. If there is a ‘dark horse’ in the competition, Paladin /Roland may be the odds-makers’ favourite as a long shot. Teamed with Hughes Aircraft is the Euromissile partnership of Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (West Germany) and Aerospatiale of France offering the Roland variant, Paladin. Already in service with the U.S. Air Force in Germany, as well as France, West Germany, and Spain -- Roland is not at all an unfamiliar system, but was plagued with problems not necesarily of Euromissile’s creation, when the U.S. unsuccessfully attempted major modifications to Roland a few years ago. The "Advanced Rapier Defence System has very substantial U.S. content " says Scott Brinckerhoff of United Aerospace Defence Systems (UADS) in an interview with TWR. The Rapier bid comes from a team that includes United Technologies, British Aerospace and FMC. Brinckerhoff, an official of UADS’ partner Norden Systems, points out that United Technologies companies in California have built 200 Rapiers for U.S. airfields in the U.K. Some 600 systems and over 25,000 missiles have been manufactured in Britain with more than 10,000 missiles fired by various users. Rapier has been sold to 13 countries and was in service with the British Army during the Falkland Islands crisis. UADS president, Bill Kingston who conducted the Rapier briefing at White Sands, says that "United Technologies will supply a radar and guidance package as well as the missile assembly, FMC is responsible for the tracked vehicle and its integration, while British Aerospace will provide support for the programme as it moves to a U.S. production base." From the outset UADS proposes delivery of the hybrid missile/gun Tracked Rapier system to be quickly followed by Bradley Rapier as it becomes available early in the delivery schedule. Other companies supplying components of the proposed Rapier system will be Grumman (test equipment and software), Singer (proficiency training package), and General Electric (the Bradley vehicle’s turret drive). Advanced Rapier is a term coined by UADS to distinguish the proposed version of Rapier from other members of the Rapier family and to describe the pre-planned product improvement programme for the missile, advanced passive surveillance and identification systems, and the various vehicle upgrades all to be introduced throughout the life of the FAADS project.
The home-grown U.S., ultra-modern ADATS system has an industrial team that consists mainly of American based companies, some U.S. owned companies based in Canada, and Canadian companies in the balance. Now about to enter production status, ADATS appears to be a fully FAADS compliant project and is indeed the latest and most technologically advanced of the four. Early speculation may have been correct. ADATS and Rapier, in a Home-Team versus Leading-European-Team shoot out, will be the significant contenders in a duel that in fact began months ago ... the day that ADATS was awarded the C-LLADS contract. The two groups just love to hate
each other.
PART II -- $11.5 BILLION U.S. ‘SON OF DIVAD’ -- FAAD In August of 1985, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger terminated the SGT York gun programme amidst nation-wide U.S. controversy. Designed to replace the 20 year old Chaparral/Vulcan which has equipped U.S. Army battalions since the mid-sixties, SGT York was the result of a lengthy Division Air Defense (DIVAD) acquisition programme. Now almost two years after the cancellation, the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) programme is well underway. Weinberger approved the FAAD programme in January of 1986 and in doing so stressed the urgency of "earliest possible fielding of the system". In recognition of this urgency, several interim solutions to the Army’s air defence problem were offered by system manufacturers, including British Aerospace whose generous offer of inventoried Rapier must have been hard to resist. Indeed, the Army’s steadfast commitment to the then outlined FAADS objectives and milestones was a laudable achievement considering the attractiveness of industry offers and the Army’s dilemma of a glaringly insufficient air defence capability. A MULTI-ELEMENT
INTEGRATED SYSTEM:
The threat scenario for FAAD suggests that the enemy’s electronic warfare (EW) helicopters will stand-off beyond 10 km and jam communications and air defence artillery radars, thus supporting Warsaw Pact rotary wing, fixed wing and remotely piloted vehicles. Using terrain masking techniques, enemy helicopters will locate their optimum attack positions and deliver stand-off anti-tank weapons using pop-up or indirect launch tactics. Others will commence strafing attacks using guns and rockets. Warsaw Pact fixed winged aircraft represent a significant and growing threat to Division facilities in the Close Combat Zone, the Division Forward and Rear Areas, as well as the Rear Corps Area. Close air support, run-in, strafing, lob and laydown tactics will be directed against front line troops while fighters and bombers will attack all battle zones, particularly in the rear areas behind the Close Combat Zone. Unmanned airborne vehicles will be used as artillery decoys and provide reconnaissance to enemy commanders. THE EQUIPMENT SOLUTION
Far more
comprehensive than the Canadian LLADS $1-billion project, FAADS consists of several
parts, serving a multitude of objectives, of which the replacement of DIVADS’ SGT
York is only a small portion. Addressing the complexities of a ‘future
battlefield’ and ensuring the ability of ground forces to manoeuver and sustain
battle, the new FAAD doctrine copes with the need for an organic air defence capability
for the Army’s heavy manoeuver units in a manner that is far superior to that of SGT
York. If the new system is as capable as planned, Army commanders will not only field a
potent response to air attackers, but also a formidable deterant.
WARNING: Copyright: MPRM Group Limited 2004. All rights reserved. Reproduction in part or in whole, in any manner whatsoever, is strictly forbidden. Message
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