World Missiles |
|
Main Index - ABO - Gulf War |
COUNTRY |
SYSTEM NAME |
STATUS |
RANGE (KM) |
PAYLOAD (KG) |
ORIGIN |
Afghanistan |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
Argentina |
Alacran |
O |
150 |
400 |
Domestic |
Armenia 2 |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
Russia |
Azerbaijan |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
Bahrain |
MGM-140 |
P |
165 |
560 |
USA |
Belarus |
SS-21 |
O |
120 |
480 |
USSR |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
|
Bulgaria 3 |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
SS-23 |
O |
500 |
450 |
USSR |
|
China |
CSS-8 | O | 230 | I | |
CSS-X-7 | O | 300 | 500 | I | |
CSS-6 | O | 600 | 500 | I | |
For China's other ballistic missiles, visit China's Nuclear Numbers. | |||||
Congo |
Scud-B |
O? |
300 |
1,000 |
Iran |
Egypt |
Scud-B |
O/U |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR/DPRK |
Project T |
O |
450 |
1,000 |
I/DPRK |
|
Scud-C |
O |
500 |
600 |
DPRK |
|
Vector |
D |
685 |
? |
I/DPRK |
|
France |
For France's ballistic missiles, visit France's Nuclear Numbers. | ||||
Georgia |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
Greece |
MGM-140 (ATACMS) |
O |
165 |
560 |
USA |
India |
Prithvi-150 |
O |
150 |
1,000 |
I/USSR |
Prithvi-250 |
O |
250 |
500 |
I/USSR |
|
Dhanush |
D/O? |
250 |
500 |
I |
|
Bramhos | D? | 300? | 225? | I/Russia | |
Sagarika 7 |
D? |
250-350? |
500? |
I |
|
Prithvi-350 |
D |
350 |
500 |
I/USSR |
|
Agni-I |
T |
600-750 |
1,000 |
I/US/France |
|
Agni-II |
O/P |
2,000/2,500 |
1,000 |
I/US/France |
|
Agni-III |
D | 3,000 | ? | I | |
Surya 9 |
D? |
3250+? |
? |
I |
COUNTRY |
SYSTEM NAME |
STATUS |
RANGE (KM) |
PAYLOAD (KG) |
ORIGIN |
Iran
10
|
M-7 (CSS-8) |
O |
150 |
190 |
PRC |
Scud-B |
O/U |
300 |
1,000 |
N.Korea/Domestic production |
|
Scud-C |
O |
500 |
600 -700 |
DPRK |
|
Shahab III |
T /D? |
1,300 |
1,000? |
I/DPRK/Russia |
|
Shahab IV |
D |
2,000 |
? |
I/Russia |
|
Shahab V 11 |
D? |
3,000-5,500? |
? |
I/Russia |
|
Iraq
|
Al Samoud |
D |
150 |
200 |
I |
Ababil-100 |
D |
150 |
200 |
I |
|
Al Hussein |
Hidden? |
650 |
500 |
I |
|
Israel
|
Lance |
O/S |
130 |
450 |
US |
Jericho I |
O |
500 |
1,000 |
France |
|
Jericho II |
O |
1,500 |
1,000 |
France/I |
|
Jericho III |
D |
2,500 |
1,000? |
I |
|
Kazakhstan |
Scud-B | O | 300 | 1,000 | USSR |
Tochka-U (modified SS-21) |
O |
120 |
480 |
USSR |
|
Libya
|
Scud-B |
O/U |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
Al Fatah 13 |
D/T |
950? |
500 |
I/? |
|
North Korea
|
Scud-B |
O/P |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
Scud-C Variant |
O/P |
500 |
600-700 |
I |
|
Nodong |
D/T |
1,300 |
700-1,000 |
I |
|
Taepodong I |
T |
1,500-2,000 |
1,000 |
I |
|
Taepodong II |
D |
3,500-5,500 |
1,000 |
I |
|
Pakistan |
Hatf I |
O |
80 |
500 |
I |
Hatf II/Abdali 15 |
O |
180 |
500 |
I/PRC? |
|
Hatf III /Ghaznavi/M-11 |
O |
290 |
500 |
I/PRC |
|
Shaheen I |
P/O |
700/750 |
500 |
I/PRC? |
|
Ghauri I/Hatf V/Nodong |
O |
1,300 |
500-750 |
I/DPRK |
|
Ghauri II |
D/T |
2,000? |
700 |
I/DPRK |
|
Shaheen II 17 |
D/P |
2,000/2,500 |
1,000? |
I/DPRK? |
|
Ghauri III |
D/T |
2,700-3,500 |
? |
I/DPRK |
COUNTRY |
SYSTEM NAME |
STATUS |
RANGE (KM) |
PAYLOAD (KG) |
ORIGIN |
Russia |
Scud B (SS-1c Mod 1) |
O | 300 | 1,000 | I |
SS-21 | O | 100-120 | I | ||
SS-X-26 | O | 300 | I | ||
Iskander-E | O | 275 | I | ||
For Russia's nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, visit Russia's Nuclear Numbers. | |||||
Saudi Arabia |
Dong Feng-3 |
O |
2,600 |
2,150
|
PRC |
Slovakia |
SS-21 | O | 100-120 | 480 | USSR |
Scud B | O | 300 | 1,000 | USSR | |
South Korea
|
Nike-Hercules-1 |
O |
180 |
300 |
US/I |
Nike-Hercules-2 | D | 250 | 500 | US/I | |
MGM-140 (ATACMS) |
O |
165/300 | 560 | US | |
? |
D/T |
300 |
500 |
I |
|
Syria
|
SS-21 |
O |
120 |
480 |
USSR |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
|
Scud-C 20 |
O |
500 |
600 |
DPRK IRAN |
|
Scud-D 21 |
T |
600-700 |
? |
DPRK |
|
Taiwan
|
Ching Feng |
O |
130 |
270 |
I/Israel? |
Tien Chi 22 |
D |
300 |
500 |
I |
|
Turkey |
MGM-140 (ATACMS) |
O |
165 |
560 |
USA |
Turkmenistan |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
Ukraine
|
SS-21 |
O |
120 |
480 |
USSR |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
USSR |
|
United Arab Emirates |
Scud-B |
O | 300 | 1,000 | Russia? |
United Kingdom | For the United Kingdom's ballistic missiles, visit United Kingdom Nuclear Numbers. | ||||
United States | MGM-140 (ATACMS) | O | 165 | 560 | I |
For the United States' nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, see United States Nuclear Numbers. | |||||
Vietnam |
Scud-B |
O |
300 |
1,000 |
|
Yemen
|
SS-21 |
O |
100-120 |
480 |
USSR |
Scud-B |
O/U |
300 |
1,000 | USSR | |
Scud |
(unknown) |
DPRK |
Status |
D: in Development |
O: Operational |
P: in Production |
S: in Storage |
T: Tested |
U: Used |
RANGE |
|
SRBM |
Short-range ballistic missile (<1,000 km) |
MRBM |
Medium-range ballistic missile (1,000-3,000 km) |
IRBM |
Intermediate-range ballistic missile (3,000-5,500 km) |
Origin |
I: Indigenous |
Notes |
INF Treaty: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty |
SAM: Surface-to-air missile |
1. Principle sources for this table include: National Air Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, September 2000); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "Ballistic
and Cruise Missiles," The Military Balance 1999-2000 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 309-11; National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, Unclassified National
Intelligence Estimate, September 1999; US Department of Defense (DOD), Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: GPO, November 1997); Center for Defense and International Security Studies, "Ballistic Missile
Capabilities by Country,"; and Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998). Information of China's missile
capabilities also draws on the 1999 Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (also known as the "Cox report").
2. Russia is thought to have shipped 8 Scud launchers and 24 missiles to Armenia between 1992 and 1995. See Nikolai Novichkov, "Russia Details Illegal Deliveries to Armenia," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 April 1997, p. 15.
3. Bulgaria and the United States have signed an agreement in May 2002 which commits Bulgaria to destroy its short- and medium-range missile stockpiles. The destruction of Soviet-designed SS-23, Scud, and FROGs will be financed through the U.S. Department of State.
"Bulgaria Agrees to U.S. Request to Destroy Missiles" AFP, 31 May 2002.
4. IISS lists 8 SS-23 launchers in Bulgaria, despite prohibition of SS-23 missiles by the INF Treaty.
5. Iran reportedly delivered Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to the Democratic Republic of Congo in November 1999. See "DRC Receives Iranian 'Scud' Missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 December 1999, p. 5; and Bill Gertz, "Tehran Sold Scud Missiles to Congolese,"
Washington Times, 22 November 1999.
6. The Dhanush is the naval version of the Prithvi series."Dhanush Missile Test-Fired" Times of India, September 21, 2001
7. The Indian government first acknowledged the existence of the Sagarika in October 1998, identifying it as a 250-350 kilometer sea-launched cruise missile derived from the Prithvi. Other sources maintained that the Sagarika program also contained a ballistic
missile division. The intended range and role of the Dhanush, however, suggest that it may in fact be the new name for the Sagarika ballistic missile program. See Rahul Bedi, "India Confirms Plans for Improved Agni and Naval Cruise Missile," Jane's Missiles and
Rockets, October 1998; "In Search of the Real Sagarika," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1998; and T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, "Navalised Prithvi Causes Confusion," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1999.
8. The Agni-2 test missile traveled over 1,250 kilometers in an April 1999 test. It was successfully tested (apparently in its final configuration) a second time on 17 January 2001, reportedly to a length of approximately 2,000 kilometers following its firing from a
mobile launcher. It is a road-mobile, two-stage missile with a "solid propulsion booster and liquid propulsion upper state" ("Agni-II Testfired in Final Configuration," Times of India, 17 January 2001). In a March 7, 2000 letter to Parliament Defense Minister George
Fernandes wrote that the Agni-2 had "achieved operationalization stage ... The government has decided to induct the missile system based on security needs" ("Indian Missile Set For Production," International Herald Tribune, 8 March 2001). On May 31, 2001, The Times
of India reported that the government approved the induction of the Agni-2 in 2001-2002 and the development of a longer range missile. In June of 2001, India announced it had begun limited production of the Agni II and that it would be under the control of the Army (
Rahul Bedi, "Indian Army Will Control Agni II" Jane's Defence Weekly" August 22, 2001, p. 15).
9. Estimates of the range of this new missile vary widely. The National Air Intelligence Center projects a range of 3250 kilometers, Indian scientists have claimed the range will exceed 5000 kilometers, and some Western analysts estimate 8,000-12,000 kilometers. See
Vivek Raghunvanishi, "India to Develop Extensive Nuclear Missile Arsenal," Defense News, 24 May 1999; Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in
2010: What Are the Policy and Technology Challenges?, April 1997,; and David Tanks, "Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: Are ICBMs a Future Possibility?" Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Appendix III: Unclassified Working
Papers.
10. The DOD reported that Iran also produces a 200-km "Zelzal" missile and a 150-km "Nazeat" missile, which may be variations of its "Mushak" series. Iran has also tried to acquire a complete North Korean Nodong system and the Chinese M-9 and M-11 missiles.
11. Estimates of the range of this new IRBM are only speculative, drawing upon remarks by the Iranian Defense Minister, who identified the missile as the "Shahab-5". Kenneth Timmerman also suggested that Iran might be developing an IRBM (which he called the "Kosar")
on July 13, 1999 during hearings on the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999. See Hearings of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, US House Committee on Science, ; and Bill Gertz, "Tehran Increases
Range on Missiles," Washington Times, 22 September 1999.
12. One intelligence report called the Al Samoud a "scaled down Scud." See "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," US Government White Paper No. 3050, released February 17, 1998. While this missile has a range of about 150km (the maximum range allowed for
Iraqi missiles by UN Security Council resolutions), there are concerns that Iraq continues to devote resources to the Ababil and Al Samoud programs with the intention of quickly transferring these resources back to missiles with longer ranges following the end of
sanctions. These concerns are reiterated in the DoD's January 2001 "Proliferation: Threat and Response": "the Al-Samoud is essentially a scaled-down SCUD ... We believe that the Al Samoud missile ... has an inherent potential to exceed the 150-km range restriction
imposed under UNSCR 687." The report also registers similar concerns about the Ababil-100. The 2001 NIE noted that a December 2000 parade showcased the Al Samoud on new trasnporter-erector-launchers, and that it will, "be deployed soon."
13. Though intended to have a range of 950 kilometers, the Al Fatah has been successfully tested to only 200 kilometers. See Department of Defense Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, p. 47-48. The CIA's Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000 notes that "Libya's current capability remains limited to its aging Scud B missiles, but with continued foreign assistance it may achieve an MRBM
capability-a long-desired goal." There are unconfirmed reports that Libya has attepmted to purchase longer range missiles from North Korea (Scud-C and Nodong models have been mentioned).
14. The missile impacted 1,320 kilometers from the launch point. It attempted and failed to put a small satellite into orbit, demonstrating some progress in staging technology.
15. The Hatf-2 was once thought to be a variant of the M-11 missiles transferred by China. The most recent test of this missile in May of 2002 revealed it to have a significantly shorter range than the M-11. An alternative view supplyed by one analysis suggests that
Pakistan developed the Hatf-2 based on French sounding rocket engines that it obtained. See S. Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, March 1990, p. 4.
16. Pakistan claimed that the missile impacted 1,100 kilometers from its launch point. The Ghauri (liquid fuel) and Shaheen (solid fuel) projects are run by different laboratories.
17. See Atul Aneja, "Pakistan Begins Work on Shaheen-II," The Hindu, 27 September 1999. Proliferation: Threat and Response 2000 notes that Pakistani officials have mentioned the Shaheen-II and Ghaznavi, but does not comment on the projects themselves.
18. See "Pakistan Tests Ghauri 3 Engine; Says New Shaheen Missile in Development," Current Missile News, Center for Defense and International Security Studies, 9 July 1999 ; "Pakistan Tests Ghauri III Engine," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 October 1999, p. 6.
19. See "South Korea Launches Missile in Its First Test Since Last Year" New York Times, November 22, 2001.
20. The Jerusalem Post reported development of an advanced Syrian modification of the Scud-C (possibly the Scud-D tested September 2000?), but this report has not been confirmed by Western sources. See Arieh O'Sullivan, "Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon-Source,"
Jerusalem Post, 16 September 1999.
21. There is some debate regarding the origins of the 700 km Scud-D that Syria tested in September 2000. The term Scud-D generally refers to extended range Scuds developed and exported by North Korea. According to U.S. and Israeli officials, the Syrian Scud-D is not
a North Korean missile, but rather an extended-range Scud-C that Syria developed indigenously. This missile uses a motor similar to the Scud-C but has a larger fuselage that allows it to carry more fuel. Syria now may have serial production capability of this
missile. See "Syria Preparing to Build Extended-Range 'Scud'" Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 June 2002.
22. This program was reportedly initiated in autumn 1995 and is based on the Sky Bow II SAM.
23. See "India Follows Pakistan In Test-Firing Missile." Washington Post, 5 October 2002, p.13
24. See "Iran: Tehran Confirms Successful Shahab-3 Test." Global Security Newswire, 28 May 2002. Iranian Defense Minister, Ali Shamkhani, indicated that the test did not signify the start of production or any increase in the missile's present range, 800-miles. He
also suggested that Iran has no plans of developing a Shahab-4 or Shahab-5.
25. See: "Shahab-3/Zelzal-3" GlobalSecurity.org. This failed test is thought to be the fourth or fifth flight test of the Shahab-3 missile, which was to be ready for deployment by the end of 2002.
26. See: "Syria Preparing to Build Extended-Range 'Scud.'" Jane's Defence Weekly. By Steve Rodan. June 19, 2002.
27. See "India Successfully Test-Fires Agni-I Missile," Times of India Online. By Rajat Pandit. January 9, 2003
28. See "Pakistan Blasts Indian Missile Test." CNN News Online. January 9, 2003
Missile Types:
Ballistic missiles differ from military rockets, such as the widely proliferated FROG system, because they have guidance systems. The development of accurate guidance systems remains one of the most challenging engineering obstacles facing states wishing to indigenously develop ballistic missiles. Only 11 nations have missiles with ranges over 1000 km; all the rest have only short-range, Scud-type missiles. Only 8 nations have been able to devleop nuclear weapons that could be fitted as warheads on these missiles.
Ballistic missiles are sometimes confused with cruise missiles. A ballistic missile is one whose payload reaches its target by way of an initial powered boost and then a free flight along a high arcing trajectory. Part of the flight of longer-range ballistic missiles may occur outside the atmosphere and involve the "reentry" of a warhead or the missile. A cruise missile, as defined by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, is "an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path." Such a missile may carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead (definitions are taken from an arms control glossary provided by the U.S. State Department). The U.S. National Air Intelligence Center further stipulates that cruise missiles are "usually categorized by intended mission and launch mode" e.g. anti-shipping cruise missile, land-attack cruise missile, air-launched cruise missile, submarine-launched cruise missile.